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Abstract We examine international cooperation on technological development as an
alternative to international cooperation on emission reductions. We show that without any
R&D cooperation, R&D in each country should be increased beyond the non-cooperative
level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in other coun-
tries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, or (iii) the domestic carbon
tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. We also show that a second-best
technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with the first-
best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international
R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-best technol-
ogy agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest
and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement.
Keywords Climate policy · International climate agreements · R&D policy ·
Technology spillovers
JEL Classification H23 · O30 · Q20 · Q38 · Q48 · Q54
1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol is the result of international negotiations over many years. If honored,
it will reduce emissions in the period 2000-12 compared with ‘Business-as-Usual’ (BaU)
emissions. There are, however, many weaknesses with the agreement; limited coverage,
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moderate emission reductions requirements, and uncertainty whether there will be any
follow-up after 2012, see, for example, Böhringer and Vogt (2003).
Because of the shortcomings of the ‘Kyoto track’, several observers have asked whether
other types of agreements might be designed to support large reductions of GHG emissions.
One idea that has been proposed is to focus not directly on emissions but instead on policies
affecting emissions. An obvious candidate would be a common carbon tax, as discussed by,
for example, Cooper (1998), Wiener (1999), Victor (2001), Victor and Coben (2005) and
Golombek and Hoel (2006).
Another idea would be to focus on technology improvements in order to reduce abate-
ment costs, as this might increase a country’s willingness to undertake significant emission
reductions. For example, it is beneficial to supplement a Kyoto type of agreement with tech-
nology elements if technological development depends not only on a country’s own R&D
investment but also on R&D by other countries through cross-country technology spillovers.
Even with no explicit agreement on emissions, a technology agreement leading to increased
R&D, and thus to lower abatement costs, might result in a reduction in emissions. This is the
background for the proposals of a climate agreement on technology development, see, for
example, Barrett (2003, Sect. 15.13) and Barrett (2006).
In the present paper we examine international cooperation on technological development
as an alternative to international cooperation on emission reductions. The basic idea of cooper-
ating on technological development is to spur innovation and/or diffusion of climate-friendly
technologies.
Cooperation on technological development may be designed in several ways. For example,
it may commit governments to finance, or organize, basic research on a limited number of
technologies, or to develop technology standards that all countries commit to impose domes-
tically. Alternatively, countries may cooperate on policies directed toward private agents,
for example, by providing instruments (e.g., technology subsidies or tax breaks) that fos-
ter more R&D or increased application of new technologies. Cooperation on technological
development may also seek to stimulate information sharing between firms by, for example,
designing appropriate environments for research joint ventures: see Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998).
Below we focus on innovations by private firms that through economic instruments are
encouraged to undertake R&D. We assume that R&D leads to improved technology that
decreases the marginal cost of emission reductions; this is the standard definition of environ-
mental R&D, see, for example, Milliman and Prince (1989), Jung et al. (1996), and Fischer
et al. (2003).
Section 2 presents a model where there is a standard negative climate externality as well
as a positive technology externality: each country’s technology level increases not only as its
own R&D increases, but also as a consequence of increased R&D in other countries through
learning. We assume that each country’s income is increasing in emissions and its technology
level, which depends on R&D expenditures in all countries. The social optimum, which is
our reference case, is examined in Sect. 3. The first-best outcome can be reached by imposing
the Pigovian tax (to correct for the climate externality) and a suitable technology subsidy
(to correct for technology spillovers).
Our starting point (Sects. 4 and 5) is a situation where there is no cooperation on technolog-
ical development: in each country the government sets an R&D subsidy non-cooperatively.
Further, in each country there is an exogenous carbon tax, assumed equal for all countries.
The magnitude of the carbon tax rate reflects whether there is some cooperation on emissions,
see the discussion below. For a given R&D subsidy and a given carbon tax, profit maximizing
firms determine R&D and emissions.
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We consider three cases for the exogenous carbon tax. First, the carbon tax is chosen non-
cooperatively, which implies that the tax will be set equal to a country’s marginal climate cost.
Second, countries participate in an international quota agreement with tradable permits. The
domestic carbon tax rate will then be equal to the international quota price. Third, countries
participate in an international tax agreement, that is, an agreement that dictates the domestic
carbon tax to be used in all countries.
We assume that in each country only a fraction of the total returns to R&D are captured
by the investing firms. Therefore, even without any international R&D cooperation, it is
optimal for each country to subsidize R&D investment. However, in Sect. 6 we show that
this non-cooperative subsidy is lower than the socially optimal subsidy if at least one of the
following three conditions are satisfies: (i) there are positive cross-country spillovers (i.e.,
the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in another country), (ii)
the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian tax, that is, the sum of marginal climate
costs of all countries, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international
tax agreement.
In Sect. 7 we analyze an international R&D agreement which specifies a second-best R&D
subsidy to be implemented in all countries. This subsidy is determined by the group of all
countries so as to maximize total welfare per country, taking into account how firms will
respond to the agreement in the next stages of the game. Like in Sect. 5, there is a common
(exogenous) carbon tax in all countries.
We find that the second-best subsidy, as well as the non-cooperative subsidy, depend on
the exogenous carbon tax, and they tend to be lower the higher is the carbon tax. Yet, the
second-best subsidy always exceeds the non-cooperative subsidy.
In Sect. 8 we compare the second-best technology agreement with the three cases with-
out R&D cooperation—each case is characterized by an exogenous tax rate reflecting the
degree/type of cooperation, see discussion above. When the domestic carbon tax is the same
in the second-best technology agreement and the cases without R&D cooperation, wel-
fare is highest, R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best technology
agreement.
In Sect. 8 we also introduce three types of agreements: a pure quota agreement is an
agreement where quotas are set so that the carbon price is equal to the Pigovian level, but
where there is no cooperation on R&D policies. A pure tax agreement is an agreement
where the carbon tax is set in the agreement, equal to the Pigovian level, but there is no
cooperation on R&D policies. Finally, in a pure technology agreement the R&D subsidy is
chosen to maximize the social welfare of all countries, while the domestic carbon tax is at
the non-cooperative level.
We show that if climate costs are negligible, both a pure quota agreement and a pure
tax agreement have lower R&D investment, higher emissions and lower welfare than a pure
technology agreement. If instead technology spillovers are negligible, the rankings may
be reversed. Finally, in Sect. 9 we discuss some of our simplifying assumptions and point at
topics for future research.
2 Spillovers and Technological Progress
In this section we study how R&D investment in one country affects the technology in other
countries. Further, we formalize the relationship between the income of a country and total
R&D expenditures, and derive an equilibrium relationship between R&D investment and
technology level at the country level.
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2.1 Spillovers
We assume that there are n identical countries, and that each country invests in R&D. The
technology level y of a particular country, henceforth referred to as the home country, is
assumed to depend on its own R&D investment (x) and the amount of R&D investment
by other countries (x∗).1 While technology spillovers allow a country to benefit from other
countries’ R&D investment, only a part γ (with 0 < γ < 1) of other countries’ R&D invest-
ment is assumed beneficial for a country. Formally, the technology level of the home country
(y) is assumed given by
y = x + γ (n − 1)x∗. (1)
In (1) we have assumed an additive structure of technology spillovers, so that the technology
level of a country depends on the sum of all countries’ R&D investment, corrected by the
technology diffusion parameter γ . R&D investments abroad, corrected by the technology
diffusion parameter, are hence a perfect substitute for domestic R&D investments.2
The technology level of a particular foreign country (y∗) is determined–seen from the
home country–in a similar way to (1):
y∗ = x∗ + γ [x + (n − 2)x∗] . (2)
In (2) the first term is R&D investment in the particular foreign country, while the terms in
the square brackets are the spillover effect from the ‘home’ country plus the spillover effects
from all other countries.
For the subsequent analysis, it is useful to derive a relationship between R&D investment
in one country and the technology levels of countries. From (1) and (2) we obtain
x = hy + (H − h)y∗ (3)
where the constants h and H are given by
h = 1 + (n − 2)γ
1 + (n − 2)γ − (n − 1)γ 2 (4)
H = 1
1 + (n − 1)γ . (5)
It is straightforward to show that 0 < H < 1 < h. Moreover, h is increasing in γ while
H is declining in γ . For the limiting case of γ = 0 we have h = H = 1. Note that in an
equilibrium with y = y∗, (3) reduces to
x = H y. (6)
2.2 Technological Progress
We assume that each country’s income is increasing – up to a limit – in its own emissions.
Put differently, each country has an emission level that would follow from its optimization
1 With identical countries, R&D investment will be equal in all countries in equilibrium. However, in order to
find the equilibrium it is expedient to distinguish between R&D investment in a particular country and R&D
investment in the other countries.
2 The modeling assumption of linear spillovers goes back at least to Spence (1984). An alternative view is
found in Cohen and Levinthal (1989), where it is argued that the ability of an agent to learn from others may
depend on its own R&D effort. Golombek and Hoel (2004) apply the ideas of Cohen and Levinthal on climate
policy. Sena (2004) gives an overview of the (empirical) literature on knowledge spillovers.
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problem if the solution of this problem was made without considering the environmental
impact of the emissions. This is often called the country’s Business as Usual (BaU) emission
level, and it will typically depend on the technology level of the country. Reducing emissions
below the BaU level is costly: that is, it reduces the country’s income.
Following Popp (2004, 2006), we formalize the cost of reducing emissions by the income
function R(e, y), where e are emissions and y is technology level. R(e, y) is the aggregate
income function of each country. The emission level that maximizes R(e, y) is the BaU
emission level, denoted b(y). R(e, y) is concave and differentiable, and for e < b(y) the
function R(e, y) is increasing in both its arguments. We also assume that when e < b(y),
technology development reduces marginal abatement costs: that is, Rey < 0 for e < b(y).
The main results in the present papers depend on Rey < 0. In our model Rey < 0 is
a necessary condition to ensure that a profit maximizing firm will i) reduce its emissions
if its technology level is increased, and ii) increase its technology level if the carbon price
is increased. In the Appendix we explore under what conditions Rey < 0 for technology
improvements that may lower carbon emissions. These are technology advances that either
increase energy efficiency, or reduce costs of non-carbon energy, or reduce costs of carbon
capture and storage (CCS). We argue that for these types of technology advances, Rey < 0
under reasonable assumptions.
3 The Social Optimum
Welfare of each country is given by net income R(e, y) minus R&D expenditures and envi-
ronmental costs. Below the unit cost of R&D investment is normalized to 1. Further, we let the
marginal environmental cost for each country, δ, be constant and identical across countries.
Hence, the environmental damage of a country is δne in a symmetric equilibrium where each
country has an emission level e. In the first-best social optimum, all firms must have the same
emission level (e) as well as identical amounts of R&D investment (x). In this case total net
benefits per country are therefore given by
R(e, y) − H y − δne (7)
where we have used x = H y, cf. (6). Maximizing (7) with respect to emissions e and the
technology level y gives
Re(e, y) = nδ (8)
and
Ry(e, y) = H. (9)
Equation (8) is the standard requirement that marginal costs of abatement should equal the
sum of marginal environmental costs for all countries, that is, the Pigovian level.
Rewriting (9) as Ry H−1 = 1 gives us a straightforward interpretation of the second first-





should equal marginal costs of R&D investment (normalized
to 1). We will later show that the first-best social optimum can be implemented through a
suitable carbon tax (nδ) and a suitable technology subsidy (see discussion after (22)).
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4 Emissions and R&D in a Four-stage Game
We now analyze the market outcome when countries make individual decisions. The market
outcome follows from a four-stage game, which determines emissions and R&D in each
country. The four stages can briefly be described as follows3:
1. The government in each country sets an R&D subsidy (non-cooperatively or imposed
through an international agreement)
2. R&D in each country is determined by profit-maximizing firms
3. The government in each country sets a carbon tax
4. Emissions in each country are determined by profit-maximizing firms.
We start with stage 4. In this stage the technology level y is given from stage 2 and the car-
bon tax t is given from stage 3. Because R(e, y) is the income of a representative producer,
profit-maximizing producers choose emissions in order to maximize R(e, y) − te, giving
Re(e, y) = t. (10)
Equation (10) defines emissions as a function of the carbon tax and the technology level:
e = e(t, y). (11)
The assumption that R(e, y) is strictly concave implies et < 0, while Rey(e, y) < 0 implies
that ey < 0.
In stage 3 each government chooses its carbon tax. We assume that this tax rate is identical
in all (identical) countries, denoted t . Below we distinguish between three cases with respect
to the carbon tax rate and how a single country evaluates emission reductions.
Case 1: Non-Cooperative Decisions
In case 1 the tax rate is chosen non-cooperatively. Hence, each country finds, using (10),
the tax rate that maximizes R(e, y) − δ [e + (n − 1)e∗] when emissions in all other coun-
tries, e∗, are taken as given. This gives the tax rate t = δ, see Table 1. When the tax rate is
chosen non-cooperatively, each country evaluates emission reductions (ν) equal to its mar-
ginal environmental cost (δ). To sum up, under non-cooperative decisions we have ν = t = δ.
Case 2: Quota Agreement
In this case countries participate in an international quota agreement with tradable per-
mits. The basic idea of a climate agreement is to internalize that own emissions have negative
impact on the welfare of other countries. We therefore assume that the total amount of permits
is set so that the corresponding international quota price exceeds the marginal environmental
cost of each country, δ. In addition, we assume that the international quota price is used as
the domestic tax rate t . Hence, t > δ.
Further, we assume that the international quota price might be less than nδ,reflecting that
countries, for various reasons, are not able to reach a fully optimal agreement, for example,
because of incentives to free ride. Thus, t ≤ nδ. Finally, when a country participates in an
international quota agreement, own emission can be increased by buying a quota. Hence,
ν = t. To sum up, under a quota agreement we have δ < ν = t ≤ nδ.
3 The assumption that R&D investment is determined before emissions reflects the fact that it takes more time
to change the technology level than emissions.
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Table 1 Domestic carbon taxes
and valuation of own emissions Carbon tax t Valuation of own
emissions ν
Non-cooperative decisions t = δ ν = t = δ
Quota agreement δ < t ≤ nδ ν = t > δ
Carbon tax agreement δ < t ≤ nδ ν = δ < t
Case 3: Carbon Tax Agreement
In the last case there is an international agreement dictating the carbon tax to be imposed
in each country. This tax might be less than nδ, again reflecting that countries, for various
reasons, are not able to reach a fully optimal international agreement. Thus, δ < t ≤ nδ.
When a country participates in an international agreement that directly specifies the domes-
tic carbon tax, it is reasonable that the country valuates reduced emissions only by the effect
lower emissions have on the country’s own climate costs, that is, v = δ. To sum up, under a
carbon tax agreement we have δ = ν < t ≤ nδ.
Table 1 summarizes the discussion above.4 As seen from the Table, evaluation of own
emissions equals the marginal climate cost, except under a quota agreement where evaluation
equals the quota price. For all cases we assume that all countries use the same tax rate and
have the same valuation of emissions (since countries are identical).
In stage 2 the producers in each country choose x to maximize their profits, taking the
R&D subsidy rate, denoted σ , as given from stage 1. If there were no imperfections in the
markets for innovations, then R(e, y) − (1 − σ)x − te is maximized, taking R&D in other
countries (x∗) as given. Using (1), (10) and (11), we obtain Ry(e, y) = 1 − σ .
The discussion above assumes that private firms capture the full social benefit of their
R&D investments. However, according to Popp (2006), several empirical studies suggest
that the social returns to R&D are about four times higher than the private returns. The dif-
ference reflects—seen from the perspective of a single firm—various “imperfections” like
limited intellectual property rights.
Below we do not model the equilibrium relationship between private and social returns
to R&D.5 Instead we simplify and consider the outcome of R&D decisions, assuming that
a firm is able to capture only a fraction k of the entire social value of its successful R&D
investment. Hence, whereas Ry(e, y) is the social value of R&D investment, k Ry(e, y) is the
private value accruing to the firm investing in R&D and hence (1 − k)Ry(e, y) is the value
accruing to all other firms. The first-order condition for a firm wrt. R&D is therefore
k Ry(e, y) = 1 − σ (12)
where k is assumed to be identical across countries. Together with (10) this gives
y = y(σ, t). (13)
The assumption that R(e, y) is strictly concave implies yσ > 0, while Rey(e, y) < 0 com-
bined with R(e, y) being strictly concave implies that yt > 0. Whereas we have not explicitly
4 Another possible case is that each country has some type of altruism, implying that it (partly) internalizes
the climate costs of other countries. We leave it to the reader to examine this case.
5 This relationship can be modelled along the same line as the modelling of spillovers and technology level
in Sect. 2.
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included k in the function for y, the concavity of R(e, y) implies that y is higher the higher
is k.
For the foreign countries we correspondingly have (remembering that the carbon tax is
assumed to be the same in all countries)
y∗ = y (σ ∗, t) . (14)
We are now ready to proceed to the first stage of the game. The case of non-cooperatively
determination of the R&D subsidy is examined in Sects. 5 and 6, whereas the R&D subsidy
being determined through an international technology agreement is studied in Sect. 7.
5 Non-cooperate Determination of R&D Subsidies
Above we introduced three carbon tax policy rules, see Table 1. Because these rules are
exogenous, the carbon tax in stage 3 is assumed to be independent of the technology levels.
It then follows from (13) and (14) (and yσ > 0) that the technology levels are uniquely deter-
mined by the subsidy rates. A game of choosing subsidy rates is therefore equivalent to a
game of choosing technology levels, and below we let countries choose their own technology
level, taking the technology level of other countries (y∗) as given. Hence, our (home) country
maximizes
R(e, y) − [hy + (H − h)y∗] − ve (15)
w.r.t. y, where we have used (3) and v is the country’s valuation of own emissions, see
the discussion related to Table 1. Maximization of (15) and using (10) gives the first-order
condition for the technology level:
Ry(e, y) = h + (t − v)(−ey(t, y)). (16)
Together with (12), i.e., k Ry(e, y) = 1 − σ , we find the optimal subsidy
σ = 1 − k [h + (t − v)(−ey(t, y))
]
. (17)
When emissions are evaluated at the same rate as the carbon tax, i.e., v = t , we have
σ = 1 − kh < 1 − k for ν = t. (18)
Note that this expression gives the equilibrium subsidy whenever ν = t , i.e., for the two
first cases in Table 1 (non-cooperative decisions or quota agreement). As usual, k < 1 (firms
are not capturing the full return to R&D investment) tends to make the subsidy positive, while
h > 1 tends to make it negative (i.e., a tax on R&D). The latter effect represents the incentive
for each country to free ride on R&D of other countries instead of doing R&D themselves.
As seen from (17), the subsidy is negative if 1k − h < (t − v)(−ey(t, y)).
If we instead have the third case in Table 1 (carbon tax agreement), that is, ν = δ < t ,
each country would choose the subsidy
σ = 1 − k [h + (t − δ)(−ey(t, y))
]
< 1 − kh < 1 − k f or ν = δ < t. (19)
In this case the equilibrium subsidy is lower the higher is the carbon tax, at least if−eyt (t, y) >
0.6 The reason is that each country is now committed to impose a carbon tax on its firms that
exceeds its own evaluation of increased emissions (t > ν = δ). Thus, the tax tends to provide
6 For an economic interpretation of −eyt (t, y) > 0, see Golombek and Hoel (2006).
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too much abatement relative to what is optimal for a county based on its pure self interest. A
country will partly adjust for this affect through a low technology subsidy to its firms, which
tends to reduce the technology level of the country. Under our assumption Rey < 0, marginal
cost of abatement will now increase (because y has been reduced), and hence emissions will
be raised. A higher tax is therefore compensated by a lower technology subsidy.
As seen from (19), the subsidy is lower i) the more the imposed tax rate exceeds the
country’s evaluation of increased emissions, i.e., the higher is (t − δ) when ν = δ, ii) the
more emissions respond to a higher technology level, i.e., the higher is (−ey), iii)
the more private firms capture of the returns to R&D, i.e., the higher is k, and iv) the higher
is the rate of diffusion, i.e., the higher is γ and thus h, see the discussion after (5).
The term in the square bracket in (19) is larger than 1 for all t ∈ [δ, nδ] due to h > 1.
From (18) and (19) we thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The non-cooperative R&D subsidy rate is always lower than 1 − k, and may
even be negative (i.e., an R&D tax). If countries value reduced emissions by the carbon tax
rate (ν = t), the non-cooperative subsidy is 1 − kh. If countries instead value reduced emis-
sions by its marginal environmental cost δ and t > δ (countries participate in an international
carbon tax agreement), the non-cooperative subsidy is lower than 1 − kh.
6 The Benefits of Improved Technology
So far we have studied the four-stage game when the government in each country sets an R&D
subsidy non-cooperatively. Before examining the case where the R&D subsidy is determined
in an optimally designed international agreement (Sect. 7), we consider the more modest goal
of increasing R&D in all countries compared with the case without any cooperation on R&D.
A common increase in R&D will give all countries an increase in their technology level y
relative to the non-cooperative outcome. Using (16), the benefit for each country of a small
increase in y is
 = Ry(e, y) − H + (nδ − t)(−ey(t, y)) = h − H + (nδ − v)(−ey(t, y)) (20)
which is positive since h > H, nδ ≥ ν, and ey < 0. The benefits of improved technology
are thus greater:
– the greater is h − H , which is increasing in the international diffusion parameter γ
– the greater is the term nδ−v. If v = δ (carbon tax agreement), this term is simply equal to
(n −1)δ. If v = t (non-cooperative decisions or quota agreement), then nδ−v = nδ− t ,
which is higher the lower is the carbon tax t
– the more emissions are reduced as a consequence of improved technology (−ey).
According to the second bullet point, under a carbon tax agreement it is beneficial to increase
the R&D level, and this is the case independent of the magnitude of the imposed tax.
From (20) we see that unless v = t = nδ (full internalization of the climate costs of other
countries through a carbon tax agreement or a quota agreement), and there are no cross-
country technology spillovers (h = H), it is welfare improving to increase R&D investment
beyond the non-cooperative level if ey < 0, i.e., if Rey(e, y) < 0. Finally, in the case of full
internalization of other countries’ climate costs and no cross-country technology spillovers,
the equilibrium coincides with the first-best outcome, which of course cannot be improved
upon.
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7 An International Technology Agreement
In this section we analyze an international agreement which regulates technology policies
- we assume that the agreement specifies a common R&D subsidy to be implemented in
all countries. The subsidy is determined by the group of all countries so as to maximize
total welfare per country, taking into account how firms will respond to the agreement in the
next stages of the game. Because the first-best outcome cannot be reached within such an
agreement (see below), the chosen subsidy is a second-best subsidy. Due to (13) and (14),
choosing a common subsidy is equivalent to choosing a common technology level (when
the choice of the common carbon tax rule is assumed independent of the technology level).
Below we therefore find the technology level y that maximizes total welfare per country,
given by (7), subject to the constraint e = e(t, y), see (11). The first-order condition of this
problem is (using (10)):
Ry = H + (nδ − t)ey ≤ H. (21)
Using (12), we find that in order to obtain this outcome the second-best subsidy must be
given by
σ = 1 − k [H − (nδ − t)(−ey(t, y))
]
> 1 − k. (22)
If the carbon tax is at the Pigovian level t = nδ, the optimal subsidy is 1 − k H. Using (8),
(9) and (12), we see that the first-best social outcome is now achieved. Below we therefore
term 1 − k H the first-best subsidy. The discussion above leads to the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 In an international technology agreement, the second-best R&D subsidy is
higher than 1 − k, and thus higher than the non-cooperative subsidy. If the carbon tax is at
the Pigovian level t = nδ, the optimal subsidy is 1 − k H, and the first-best social optimum
is achieved.
Proposition 2 and (22) imply that the second-best R&D subsidy will be higher than the
first-best subsidy 1 − k H if t < nδ. Moreover, the first-best R&D subsidy 1 − k H is higher
than the non-cooperative R&D subsidy (because H < 1), cf. Proposition 1. These results
tend to suggest that R&D investment, and hence the technology level, is higher under a sec-
ond-best technology agreement than in the first-best outcome, and also that the technology
level is higher in the first-best outcome than in the case without any R&D agreement. One
should, however, be careful because the ranking of technology level does not follow directly
from the R&D subsidy rate; it also depends on how emissions are determined. We consider
this issue in the next section.
8 Comparison of Emissions and R&D
In the previous sections we have considered five outcomes, namely the first-best social opti-
mum (Sect. 4), three cases with an exogenous carbon tax and non-cooperative determination
of R&D (Sect. 5) and an international technology agreement with an exogenous carbon tax
(Sect. 7). In this section we compare these cases.
In Fig. 1 we have drawn the two curves representing Re(e, y) = nδ and Ry(e, y) = H,
corresponding to Eqs. (8) and (9). It is easily verified that the properties of the function
R(e, y) imply that these two curves are downward sloping in the (e, y) diagram and that
Re(e, y) = nδ is steeper than Ry(e, y) = H. At the intersection point F of these two curves,
both Eqs. (8) and (9) hold, so this point represents the first-best social optimum.
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Fig. 1 Welfare ranking of international environmental agreements
In Fig. 1 we have also drawn two iso-welfare curves. Along each such curve net benefits
of each country—given by (7)—are constant, and net benefits are higher the closer the curve
is to the maximum point F . From the conditions (8) and (9) of the first-best social optimum,
it follows that the iso-welfare curves are horizontal at the intersections with Re(e, y) = nδ,
and vertical at the intersections with Ry(e, y) = H.
We have also drawn curves for Re(e, y) = t < nδ (relation (10)) and Ry(e, y) = h in
Fig. 1. Because nδ > t , the curve Re(e, y) = t must lie to the right of the curve Re(e, y) = nδ.
Similarly, since H < h, the curve Ry(e, y) = h must lie below the curve Ry(e, y) = H.
Because relation (10) is valid both with and without cooperation on R&D, these equilibria
are located somewhere on the line Re(e, y) = t . Notice that the exact position of this curve
depends on t , and will lie further to the left the higher is t . Without cooperation on R&D,
the equilibrium condition for R&D is given by (16), and we have to distinguish between our
three cases, see Table 1.
With non-cooperative decisions as well as under a quota agreement, emission reductions
are valued by the domestic carbon tax (ν = t). Then (16) is reduced to Ry(e, y) = h, and
these two cases are therefore represented by point M in Fig. 1. Under a carbon tax agreement
t > ν,and from (16) we then have Ry(e, y) > h. Hence, point N in Fig. 1 represents the
case of an international tax agreement. Notice that N coincides with M for the limiting case
of t = δ. Comparing M or N with F we have the following:
Proposition 3 Emissions are higher and R&D lower in the case of no cooperation on R&D
than in the first-best social optimum.
Under an international technology agreement R&D is determined by (21), implying that
Ry(e, y) < H . Hence, the equilibrium must be somewhere above the curve Ry(e, y) = H .
Because Re(e, y) = t is valid also in this equilibrium, in Fig. 1 point P represents the
equilibrium under a technology agreement.
In Fig. 1, emissions and the technology level are higher in P than in F (first-best outcome).
However, this ranking depends on the way we have drawn the curves in Fig. 1. In general,
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several rankings are possible. For example, the technology level may be lower and emissions
higher in P than in F. However, from Fig. 1 we see that if emissions are lower in P than in
F , then the technology level is higher in P than in F .
From (21) we see that P lies closer to the line Ry(e, y) = H the (i) smaller is nδ − t,
and (ii) the smaller is −ey . If t = nδ, then Ry = H and P coincides with F . If ey ≈ 0 -
reflecting that Rey ≈ 0 - along the curve Re = t, then Ry ≈ H and P is located southeast
of F .
To sum up:
Proposition 4 The ranking of R&D investment and emissions between the second-best tech-
nology agreement and the first-best outcome is in general ambiguous. If the Pigovian tax
is used in each country under a technology agreement, the first-best outcome is reached. If
Rey ≈ 0 along the curve Re = t, R&D investment will be lower and emissions will be higher
under a second-best technology agreement than in the first-best outcome.
We can also use Fig. 1 to compare M/N (no R&D cooperation) with P (an R&D agree-
ment) when the domestic carbon tax t is the same in these equilibria, that is, when the
equilibria are located on the same line Re(e, y) = t . We immediately get the following
result:
Proposition 5 For any given domestic carbon price t, an R&D agreement gives higher
welfare, higher R&D and lower emissions than the case of R&D policies being determined
non-cooperatively. Moreover, with non-cooperative R&D policies the second-best carbon
tax agreement (point N in Fig. 1) has lower welfare, lower R&D and higher emissions than
the second-best quota agreement (point M in Fig. 1) when t is the same in the two cases.
The case of no agreement whatsoever is given by the point M in Fig. 1 for t = δ. Starting
from this point and introducing an international quota agreement with a carbon price equal
to the Pigovian level (t = nδ), but without introducing R&D cooperation, will move the
equilibrium to Q in Fig. 1, which we term a pure quota agreement. From Fig. 1 it is clear
that the move from M to Q increases welfare, increases R&D and reduces emissions.
If we instead, starting from point M in Fig. 1 for t = δ, had introduced R&D cooperation
without any cooperation on emissions, henceforth termed a pure technology agreement, we
would move from M to P (for t = δ), which increases welfare, increases R&D and reduces
emissions.
Finally, starting from point M in Fig. 1 for t = δ and introducing an international tax
agreement where t = nδ, henceforth termed a pure tax agreement, will move the equilibrium
to T in Fig. 1.
We now compare the pure quota agreement (Q), the pure technology agreement (P) and
the pure tax agreement (T ). In Fig. 1, P has higher R&D and higher emissions than Q.
While this seems plausible, it does not hold as a general result. We now show that P may
have higher R&D or higher emissions than the equilibrium Q, and that the welfare ranking
can go either way. We start with the welfare ranking.
In the limiting case of (almost) no technology spillovers, that is,γ ≈ 0 and thus h ≈ H ≈ 1
(see the discussion after (5)), the two lines Ry = H and Ry = h will (almost) coincide. Hence,
Q will (almost) coincide with F , implying that welfare is higher under Q than under P . On
the other hand, for the limiting case of (almost) no concern for the environment, that is,
δ ≈ nδ ≈ 0 and hence t ≈ nδ, P will (almost) coincide with F , implying that welfare is
higher under P than under Q. These two cases have an obvious interpretation: if there are
two externalities, the welfare gain of correcting only one of them is largest when one corrects
the most important one. In the limiting cases above, one of the externalities was negligible.
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Consider again the limiting case of (almost) no technology spillovers (γ ≈ 0), that is,
when Q (almost) coincides with F . Assume moreover that Rey ≈ 0 for emissions along
the curve Re = δ. Then ey = −ReyRee ≈ 0, and using (21) P will (almost) be on the curve
Ry = H . If Rey < 0 for emissions to the left of the curve Re = δ, then the curve Ry = H
will be downward sloping to the left of the curve Re = δ (as in Fig. 1). In this case P must
lie southeast of F , and therefore also southeast of Q since Q (almost) coincides with F .
This is thus an example of a pure R&D agreement giving lower R&D and higher emissions
than a pure quota agreement. Next, consider the limiting case of (almost) no concern for
the environment (δ ≈ nδ ≈ 0), that is, P (almost) coincides with F. In this case P will
be located to the northwest of Q. This is thus an example of a pure R&D agreement giving
higher R&D and lower emissions than a pure quota agreement.
As seen from Fig. 1, a pure quota agreement has higher R&D, lower emissions and higher
welfare than a pure tax agreement. These results are covered in the last part of Proposition 5.
We now compare a pure technology agreement with a pure tax agreement. Assume that
γ ≈ 0 (and thus h ≈ H ) and that Rey ≈ 0 (and thus ey ≈ 0) along the curves Re = δ and
Re = nδ, whereas Rey < 0 between these curves. Then T will (almost) coincide with F
whereas P will be located southeast of F on the curve Ry = H. Therefore, R&D investment
will be higher, emissions will be lower and welfare will be higher under T than under P .
If δ ≈ nδ ≈ 0, P will (almost) coincide with F whereas T will (almost) coincide with Q
(because ν = δ ≈ nδ = t , i.e., ν ≈ t), implying that welfare is higher under P than under T .
The results above are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 6 The ranking of social welfare, R&D investment and emissions between the
pure technology agreement, the pure quota agreement and the pure tax agreement is in gen-
eral ambiguous. If climate costs are sufficiently low, both a pure quota agreement and a pure
tax agreement have lower R&D investment, higher emissions and lower welfare than a pure
technology agreement. If instead technology spillovers are sufficiently small, the rankings
may be opposite.
Note that Rey ≈ 0 along the curves Re = δ and Re = nδ implies that these curves are
almost vertical in Fig. 1. If Rey = 0 everywhere, then Re = δ and Re = nδ are vertical and
Ry = H and Ry = h are horizontal. For this special case we have the following proposition:
Proposition 7 If Rey = 0, a pure technology agreement has the same technology level as the
first-best outcome, but higher emissions. The pure quota agreement coincides with the pure
tax agreement, and these agreements have a lower technology level, but the same emission
level, as the first-best outcome.
9 Concluding Remarks
The aim of the present paper is to improve our understanding of the incentives to invest
in climate-friendly R&D and to abate under different institutional arrangements.7 We seek
to identify the main forces at work when improved technology lowers costs of abatement.
7 So far, there has been one initiative focusing on international cooperation on climate-friendly technolo-
gies—the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP)—which aims at accelerating the
development and deployment of clean energy technologies through expanding investment and trade in cleaner
energy technologies. To the best of our knowledge, the results of APP, where Australia, Canada, China, India,
Japan, South Korea and the United States are the partners, remain to be seen.
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Our modelling strategy is to study these forces within the simplest possible framework. Below
we discuss some of our simplifying assumptions, arguing that whereas the exact formulas
derived in the present paper clearly depend on these assumptions, our main results can be
generalized.
First, we have assumed that R&D was undertaken by private firms and could be influ-
enced by the government through an R&D subsidy. However, our conclusions would be
similar if we interpret R&D as being directly financed by the government. As noted
in Sect. 5, a game of choosing R&D subsidy rates is equivalent to a game of choos-
ing technology levels. Moreover, with cooperation over R&D, the equilibrium condition
x = H y implies that choosing y (via a common subsidy rate) or choosing x directly gives
exactly the same outcome. The second-best technology agreement is thus the same if
R&D is set directly by governments or indirectly through the choice of a common R&D
subsidy.
We now argue that also for the case of no R&D cooperation, our results are not
qualitatively changed if R&D is not determined indirectly through a subsidy, but directly
by the government. The home country was assumed to chose its technology level y (via a
subsidy rate) in order to maximize R(e, y)−[hy + (H − h)y∗]−ve, taking y∗ as given. This
problem has (16) as its first-order condition. Assume now that R&D is not determined indi-
rectly through a subsidy, but directly by the government. Inserting (1) and (3) into (15),
we find that the net benefit of a country is given by R (e, x + γ (n − 1)x∗) − x − ve.
Maximizing this expression w.r.t. x , taking x∗ as given, yields Ry(e, y) = 1 + (t −
v)(−ey(t, y)), which is almost identical to (16), the only difference being that h is
replaced by 1. However, our main results are unaffected: Propositions 1 and 2 (about
subsidy rates) are no longer relevant, while it is straightforward to see that Proposi-
tions 3–7 remain valid also for the case in which R&D investments are set directly by the
governments.
Second, countries have so far been assumed to be identical. Countries may differ along
a number of dimensions, for example, with respect to climate costs, size, technology diffu-
sion and income. At least for some of these factors, for example, the technology diffusion
parameter, it is easy to derive formulas that are not based on identical countries. However,
our main results would not change.
Third, we have assumed that all countries participate in the technology agreement. We sus-
pect that our main results would not change of there in addition to the cooperating countries
was a group of countries that did not have any, or only marginal, R&D investments (typically,
a group of developing countries). One could thus interpret our cooperating countries as some
relatively small group of large countries, for example, China, the EU, Japan and USA, which
stand for a major part of global R&D expenses.
A possible topic for future research could be to endogenise the number of participating
countries in an international environmental agreement (IEA). One approach is to endogenise
the number of signatories through applying the ‘standard’ IEA model in which countries
decide in the first stage of the game whether they will participate in the IEA, whereas in
the second stage the group of signatory countries chooses abatement in order to maximize
welfare of the IEA member countries, see, for example, Barrett (1994) and Finus (2001).
Within this framework the equilibrium number of signatories is typically small. In addition,
if costs or benefits change so that the potential net benefit of cooperation increases, the num-
ber of signatories shrinks. Both of these unwarranted properties may call for a new approach
of modelling IEAs.
Several factors may be of importance in explaining how an IEA should be designed in
order to attract broad participation. For example, burden sharing and lobbying are factors that
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may play a role in determining the number of participating countries. In fact, these factors
may favour technology agreements over emission based agreements, that is, quota or tax
agreements: under an emission agreement, some sectors will bear a disproportionately high
share of total abatement costs. Workers and owners in such sectors will often be success-
ful in lobbying against stringent abatement measures, thus making it difficult to reach an
international agreement that substantially reduces emissions.
In contrast, the costs of technology development will typically be more evenly shared by
everyone in the economy as they will be borne by the taxpayer to finance public R&D
or to give tax breaks/subsidies to private firms investing in R&D. Some sectors of the
economy producing ‘knowledge’ will even gain from such technology development, and
might thus engage in lobbying for a technology agreement. These arguments suggest that it
might be easier to obtain broad participation in a technology agreement than in an emission
agreement.
Finally, we have also a simplifying assumption related to verifiability. Under a technology
agreement, the common technology subsidy internalizes that improved technology in one
country is beneficial also for other countries. The common technology subsidy in a tech-
nology agreement is therefore higher than the technology subsidy each country would have
offered to its domestic firms in the case without an international climate agreement. Because
each country prefers—based on pure self-interest—a lower subsidy than the one dictated by
the agreement, each country has an incentive to set various non-verifiable domestic policy
instruments so that the country achieves its individually rational level of the technology sub-
sidy. This may be possible, at least to some extent, because technology policies are often
an integral part of a country’s tax system, making it really hard, if possible at all, for an
international agency to verify all aspects of other countries’ R&D policies.
In contrast, carbon emissions are easy to calculate, for example, based on fossil fuel use:
using various sources of statistics, an international agency can determine whether a country
has honoured an emission agreement or not. Thus, the limited verifiability of a technology
subsidy suggests, cet. par., that a technology agreement is less efficient than an emission
based agreement.
There is also another problem of verifiability when R&D investments are subsidized, or
more generally, when R&D firms receive government support. R&D is a vague concept, and
it is therefore hardly feasible to define R&D in such a way that an agency (regulator) can
clearly distinguish between R&D activities and non-R&D activities. Therefore, when firms
face an R&D subsidy (or some other instruments that spur their R&D activity) they have an
incentive to categorize more activities as R&D, thereby receiving a higher amount of sub-
sidies than intended. Note, however, that under an international emission based agreement
where the R&D policy of a country is determined at the national level, it will typically be
optimal to offer some type of support to the domestic R&D firms because the social returns
to R&D may by far exceed the private returns (k < 1 in our model). Therefore, the ver-
ifiability problem at the firm level is present both under R&D based and emission based
agreements.
Obviously, the non-verifiability problem of a technology agreement weakens the case for
placing too much emphasis on international technology cooperation. But it does not suggest
that it is optimal to fully disregard international R&D cooperation. Overall, our results and
discussion suggest that some steps towards including technology elements in an interna-
tional climate agreement—even in an imperfect manner—may be a valuable supplement to
emission based agreements. Thus, a topic for future research is to explore design of interna-
tional climate agreements that are both emission and technology based when there is hidden
information at the national/firm level.
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Appendix
Below we use a simple model to study under what conditions Rey(e, y) < 0. We distinguish
between three types of technology progress; increased energy efficiency, lower costs of non-
carbon energy and lower costs of carbon capture and storage (CCS). We let each type of
technology improvement be represented through a technology variable, which is treated as
an input.
Let E be effective energy:
E = E(yE , φ(F, G)),
that is, effective energy a composite good produced by fossil (F) and non-fossil (G) energy. In
addition, the amount of effective energy is increasing in the technology variable yE (E1 > 0),
reflecting increased energy efficiency. The energy input E is used together with a vector of
other inputs v-typically different types of materials—to produce gross output (v, E). Let
Q be net output in the economy:
Q = (v, E) − pF F − q(yG)G − C(F − e, yC ) − pvv.
Net output Q is obtained by subtracting the costs of using fossil energy pF F , the cost of using
non-fossil energy q(yG)G, the cost of CCS C(F − e, yC ), and the costs of other inputs pvv
from gross output (v, E). The cost of non-fossil fuels is lower the higher is the technology
variable yG(qG < 0), and the cost of CCS is lower the higher is the technology variable yC
(C2 < 0). Emissions are denoted e, and these are measured in the same unit as fossil energy
F . Hence, F − e is abatement.
Next, we define the income function
R(e, yG , yC , yE ) = maxF,G,v{(v, E) − pF F − q(yG)G − C(F − e, yC ) − pvv}
With reasonable assumptions on the underlying functions above, R(e, yE , yG , yC ) will be
strictly concave and increasing in its arguments. To check whether it is reasonable that mar-
ginal productivity of fossil energy, Re(e, yE , yG , yC ), is declining in the three technology
variables, we shall consider three simplified versions of the model.
Increased Energy Efficiency
Increased energy efficiency is sometimes vaguely described as the possibility of producing
the same output with lower energy input. However, if increased energy efficiency can only
be achieved by using more of other inputs, e.g., capital, this is simply a substitution effect.
Increased energy efficiency can be defined as the possibility of producing the same output
with lower energy input without increasing the use of other factors of production.
In order to focus on energy efficiency we ignore non-fossil energy and CCS, and assume
that the net income function is given by
R(e, yE ) = 	(α(yE )e) − pF e
where 	′ > 0 and 	′′ < 0. Increased energy efficiency is thus modelled as fossil energy
augmenting technology improvement through α(yE ), which is assumed increasing in yE . It
is straightforward to derive that Rey < 0 if and only if 	′ + α(yE )e	′′ < 0. This inequality
holds if and only if the price elasticity of e with respect to pF (measured positively) is less
than 1, that is, if ElpF (−e) = 	
′
−α(yE )e	′′ < 1, where the elasticity is defined at the point
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where Re = 0.8 The magnitude of this price elasticity is an empirical question, yet we find it
reasonable that it is below one: most empirical studies of energy demand find price elasticities
lower than one, see, for example, appendix B in Aune et al. (2008) and Kilian (2008).
Reduced Costs of Non-carbon Energy
Non-carbon energy, for example, hydropower, nuclear, solar, wind and bio-energy, are imper-
fect substitutes for carbon (fossil) energy. Technology improvements that lower the costs of
non-carbon energy will typically increase the use of this type of energy, whereas the use of
carbon energy will decline for a given level of output. However, reduced cost of non-carbon
energy will typically raise output, tending to increase the use of carbon energy. We therefore
want to examine under what conditions the former effect dominates. To this end we ignore
increased energy efficiency and CCS, and assume that the net income function is given by
R(e, yG) = maxG {(e, G) − pF e − q(yG)G}
where  is increasing in its arguments and strictly concave, and q(yG) is declining in yG . For
an interior solution for G, we have G(e, G) = q(yG), which implicitly defines the function
G = G(e, yG) where G y > 0. It is straightforward to derive that Rey = eG G y , which
is negative if and only if eG < 0. Further, the relation Re = e(e, G(e, yG)) − pF = 0
implicitly defines e = e(pF , yG) where epF < 0 because of concavity. We also have Ge < 0
if and only if eG < 0. Hence, Rey < 0 if and only if demand for non-carbon energy
G(e(pF , yG), yG) is increasing in the price of carbon energy pF ; a higher price of carbon
energy will reduce emissions (epF < 0), which will increase non-carbon energy G if and
only if eG < 0, which is a sufficient condition for Rey < 0. We think the condition eG < 0
is reasonable because typically carbon and non-carbon energy are substitutes.
Reduced Costs of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
Finally, we focus on reduced costs of CCS, that is, we ignore improved energy efficiency and
lower costs of non-carbon energy. CCS will always have some costs, and will thus not be
used if there are no restrictions on emissions. In that case, a lower CCS cost will not have any
effect on BaU output. On the other hand, if restrictions on emissions are sufficiently strict,
for example, if there is a sufficiently high carbon tax on emissions, then CCS will be used,
and reduced cost of CCS will increase its use.
We now examine the impact on the amount of carbon energy of lower costs of CCS.
Assume that the net income function is given by
R(e, yC ) = maxF {(F) − pF F − β(yC )χ(F − e)}
where  ′ > 0,  ′′ < 0, χ ′ > 0, χ ′′ > 0 and the variable β(yC ) is assumed to be declining in
yC . The optimal amount of fossil energy is given by  ′(F) = β(yC )χ ′(F − e)+ pF , which
implicitly defines the function F = F(e, yC ) where Fy > 0. From the envelope theorem we
have Re = β(yC )χ ′(F − e) =  ′(F(e, yC )) − pF . Thus Rey =  ′′(F)Fy , which is nega-
tive under our assumptions. Hence, Rey < 0 under the assumptions of a concave production
function and marginal costs of CCS being increasing in abatement
(
χ ′′ > 0
)
. We believe the
latter condition is reasonable, for example, because costs of transporting removed carbon to
the storage site differ between plants (transport length to the storage site differs), or because
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CCS is more costly for small stationary sources than for large stationary sources (different
technologies).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
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